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Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in
Postconviction Proceedings in Death
Penalty Cases
Introduction
Joseph Giarratano, an inmate on death row, describes the ordeal of
an inmate seeking postconviction remedies' without the aid of counsel:
Picture yourself in this situation. You've been convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death. You are indigent, functionally il-
literate and mildly retarded. Your court-appointed lawyer tells
you that you have a right to appeal your conviction and sentence
but that he will no longer represent you.... You've been moved
into the death house. Your only choice is for you to represent
yourself. You must file something with the court or be executed in
less than 14 days. You have the right to fie a petition for certiorari
and a petition for habeas corpus and a motion for a stay of execu-
tion. But before you can fie you must learn to read, write, over-
come your retardation, obtain your trial transcript, understand the
science of law, learn how to conduct legal research, analyze vast
amounts of case law, formulate your issues, learn all the proce-
dures, learn all the various court rules, understand civil procedure,
constitutional law, criminal law and acquire the art of legal writ-
ing. You must do all of this and much more in less than 14 days
2
Giarratano's plea for counsel fell on deaf ears. In Murray v. Giar-
ratano,3 the United States Supreme Court held that an indigent inmate
on death row does not have a constitutional right to state-appointed
counsel when seeking postconviction relief at the state level. For the in-
mate on death row, a postconviction review is an important forum for
remedying constitutional errors and a final chance to plea for his life or
1. Postconviction remedies, as used here, refer to any proceeding that reviews the valid-
ity of a conviction or sentence upon completion or expiration of direct appellate review.
2. Robbins, Rationalizing Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convic-
tions in Capital Cases, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE, Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus 45 n.85 (May 1989) (quoting McCarthy, A Defender on Death Row, Wash. Post, Apr.
15, 1989, at A21, col. 6).
3. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
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claim his innocence. Without the assistance of counsel, however, the in-
mate faces insurmountable obstacles in petitioning for state postconvic-
tion relief. The Supreme Court has failed to recognize that the state
postconviction review promotes reliability by invalidating death
sentences "flawed by fundamental factual, legal or constitutional proce-
dural error."4 Reliability-indicia that "death is the appropriate penalty
in a particular case"5 and that "the sentence was not imposed out of
whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake" 6 -is today's constitutional stan-
dard for capital punishment. This standard is mandated by the eighth
amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause.
This Comment begins with a summary of Murray v. Giarratano.
Part II discusses the standard of reliability as required by the Eighth
Amendment. Part III describes the state postconviction proceeding and
argues that it ensures the reliability of a death sentence. Part IV shows
that the availability of postconviction relief is meaningless without the
assistance of counsel. The complexity of petitioning for postconviction
review and the dilemma faced by the average inmate emphasize the need
for appointed counsel in a state postconviction proceeding. Without rep-
resentation, an inmate's valid claims justifying a sentence less than death
may never be raised.
L Murray v. Giarratano
Joseph Giarratano represented a class of indigent inmates on Vir-
ginia's death row who could not afford counsel in their postconviction
proceedings. He filed a section 19837 class action suit against various
state officials.' His pro se complaint alleged that the state's refusal to
appoint counsel in state postconviction proceedings violated the inmates'
sixth amendment right to counsel, the eighth amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the fourteenth amendment
right to due process and equal protection, including the right of access to
the court.9
In Virginia, an indigent inmate like Giarratano does not have a right
to an appointed attorney for the purpose of filing a claim for postconvic-
tion relief.10 If the inmate files a nonfrivolous claim, however, and gains
a postconviction hearing, counsel may then be appointed at the discre-
tion of the trial judge. 1 Otherwise, assistance to inmates on death row is
4. Robbins, supra note 2, at 13.
5. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1870 (1988).
6. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7. 42 U.S.C. §,1983 (1988).
8. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 512 (E.D. Va. 1986).
9. Id
10. d at 514-15; see VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (1989).
11. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 515.
limited to the provision of books from a law library and the services of
part-time attorneys at various state penitentiaries.
12
In Giarratano, the district court found that Virginia failed to pro-
vide its inmates with meaningful access to the courts. a Such access was
required by Bounds v. Smith.14 In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that
"the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of mean-
ingful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 5 The district
court in Giarratano concluded that neither allowing inmates time in the
prison law library nor loaning them law books constituted meaningful
access, particularly for those incapable of doing legal research.'
6
The district court found that the assistance of seven part-time attor-
neys was inadequate to satisfy the standard of meaningful access to the
courts because the attorneys did not provide continuous legal services
and functioned only as legal advisors. 7 The district court described
these attorneys as "talking lawbooks" who did not "sign pleadings or
make court appearances."' 8 Moreover, the attorneys served a total of
more than 2,000 prisoners.' 9 As a remedy, the district court ordered the
state of Virginia to develop a program for furnishing individual counsel
upon request to indigent death row inmates.20
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
order,21 relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Pennsylvania v. Finley,
22
which was decided subsequent to the district court's decision. In Finley,
the Court held that a noncapital defendant had no constitutional right to
a postconviction proceeding and therefore no right to an appointed coun-
sel. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reconsidered Giar-
ratano at an en banc hearing and affirmed the district court, reasoning
that Finley did not apply because it involved neither the death penalty
12. Id. at 513-14.
13. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
14. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 515 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
15. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
16. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513. The district court declared the Bounds alternative of
a law library inapplicable in Giarratano, noting that the Bounds decision relied on "'experi-
ence indicat[ing] that pro se petitioners are capable of using lawbooks to. . .' raise legitimate
claims." Id. (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826). The district court in Giarratano found that
today's capital inmates are incapable of doing legal research and therefore the Bounds assump-
tion did not apply. Id.
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id. at 517.
21. Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988).
22. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
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nor meaningful access.23
A. The Supreme Court Decision
Following petition by the State of Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. On certiorari review, a plurality of
three justices and two concurring justices reversed the en banc court of
appeals.
L The Rehnquist Plurality
In an opinion joined by two other justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that an indigent death row inmate has no constitutional right to
counsel in a state postconviction proceeding under either the Eighth
Amendment or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Although "the holding of neither [Finley 5 nor Bounds2 6] squarely de-
cide[d] the question presented in this case,"27 the plurality concluded
first that Finley applied to capital inmates and, secondly, that Finley lim-
ited Bounds. Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that "death
is different," reasoning that the capital inmate's special protection under
the Eighth Amendment is limited primarily to the trial stage and does
not extend to the postconviction stage.28 Moreover, the inmate's right to
meaningful access to the court under Bounds did not necessarily require
the assistance of counsel.29 Pointing out that a single standard suffices
for both capital and noncapital cases on federal habeas review,3" Rehn-
quist questioned the need "to require yet another distinction between the
rights of capital case defendants and [defendants] in noncapital cases" in
the state courts.31
2. The Concurring Justices
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy each filed concurring opinions
identifying the issue as a legislative one. In addition, Justice O'Connor
pointed out that postconviction remedies are civil in nature and not part
of the criminal process. 32 She alluded to the fact that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel is limited to criminal cases and therefore should
23. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
24. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). Rehnquist's opinion was joined by
Scalia and White.
25. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
26. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
27. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2772.
28. Id. at 2769-70.
29. Id. at 2772.
30. Id. at 2770 (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986)).
31. Id at 2771.
32. Id at 2772 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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not apply to a prisoner's civil suit against the state.33
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the importance and complexity of
postconviction proceedings for death row prisoners.3" He found, how-
ever, that the state's procedures were constitutional, stating that "no in-
mate on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to
represent him in postconviction proceedings."35
3. The Dissenters
Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Stevens framed the
issue as not "whether there is an absolute 'right to counsel' in collateral
proceedings, but whether due process requires that these respondents be
appointed counsel in order to pursue legal remedies."36 He concluded
that fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to provide
capital inmates with a fair opportunity to present their state postconvic-
tion claims.
3 7
Justice Stevens reflected on the critical differences between capital
postconviction and noncapital postconviction litigation. First, higher
stakes in capital cases underscore the importance of a meaningful appel-
late review process because the loss of life cannot be reversed or compen-
sated.3" Second, state procedures preclude some claims from review until
the postconviction stage.39 Even federal habeas relief for such claims is
unavailable until the inmate has pursued and developed his postconvic-
tion claims at the state level.' Finally, the capital inmate confronts a
situation more pressing than a noncapital inmate. Facing an upcoming
execution date, the inmate on death row has limited time to grapple with
the procedures of capital litigation, a task that is unusually complex even
for an attorney to master.4" Absent an impending execution and the
complexity of capital litigation, the noncapital inmate may, however, be
left to his own resources in pursuing state postconviction relief.42 These
differences convinced Justice Stevens that a capital inmate requires the
assistance of counsel to raise postconviction claims.43
33. Id.
34. I at 2772-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 2773.
36. Id. at 2776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 2781.
38. Id. at 2777.
39. Id. at 2778.
40. Id. at 2779.
41. Id. at 2780.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2781.
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II. Reliability as the Constitutional Standard in Capital
Litigation
The Eighth Amendment guarantees that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments [shall not be] inflicted."'  Although the Supreme Court has never
found capital punishment to be per se unconstitutional,45 it has inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment as requiring a standard of reliability in
capital cases.46 The Court has recognized that
the qualitative difference of death from all other punishment re-
quires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
sentencing determination. Accordingly, many of the limits that
this Court has placed on the imposition of capital punishment are
rooted in a concern that the sentencing process should facilitate the
responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion.47
By making procedural safeguards and sentencing guidelines the mainstay
of modem capital litigation,48 the Court rationalizes that a reliable proce-
dure is more likely to result in a reliable, and therefore constitutional,
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
45. In 1972 the Supreme Court held that then-existing death penalty statutes constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The
decision was based on the "wanton and freakish" application of the death penalty by statutes
that failed to guide sentencing discretion. Justices Marshall and Brennan declared that the
death penalty was per se unconstitutional, but Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White limited
their individual holdings to the particular statutes.
46. Modem capital litigation began with the Supreme Court upholding the state death
penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its companion cases, Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). At the same time, the
Court struck down the state death penalty statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
A constitutional death penalty statute "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear
and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428 (1980) (quoting, respectively, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253; and Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 303).
47. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); see Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct.
1860, 1870 (1988) ("evolving standards of societal decency have imposed a correspondingly
high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a
particular case").
The imposition of death mandates reliability in the capital convicting and sentencing pro-
cedures. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1986-87 (1988) (there exists at sentencing
a special "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment");
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980) (procedures that "introduce a level of uncer-
tainty and unreliability into the factfinding process... cannot be tolerated in a capital case").
48. The procedures approved by the Court in Gregg included the following: (1) separate
trials for conviction and sentencing phases; (2) automatic appellate review by the state supreme
court; (3) enumeration of categories of crimes as capital offenses; (4) mandatory consideration
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death sentence.49
Two principles that are inherent in reliability and required by eighth
amendment jurisprudence are "individualized sentencing" and "guided
sentencing discretion." First, any limitation on the defendant's presenta-
tion or the sentencer's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence vio-
lates the principle of individualized sentencing. 0 A mandatory death
penalty for a crime is unconstitutional because it precludes consideration
of the individual defendant's case at sentencing and risks being inappro-
priate in light of mitigating evidence."1
Second, the state has a "constitutional responsibility to tailor and
apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious inflic-
tion of the death penalty."52 Without guidelines to control jury discre-
tion, a sentence may become an arbitrary exercise of the death penalty.53
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by the sentencer; and (5) the finding of at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance before death may be imposed. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
In using aggravating and mitigating circumstances at sentencing, "[p]rosecutors, reciting
the brutality of the crime, will argue that aggravating factors predominate and death is appro-
priate. The defense will contend that mitigating evidence is sufficient and justice does not
demand death." Coyle, Strasser & Lavelle, Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's
Death Belt, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 41 [hereinafter Fatal Defense].
49. The Court has stated that
[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individ-
ual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safe-
guards fashioned by the Court over the years to diminish the risk of erroneous
conviction stands as a testament to that concern.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
One commentator explained that "[i]f a death sentence is inaccurate, it is not because it is
the 'wrong' sentence but because there is a defect in the [sentencing] selection process that
impermissibly altered the odds to favor execution." Gillers, The Quality of Mercy Constitu-
tional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. Rnv. 1037,
1043 (1985).
50. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1987) ("the sentencing authority must be
permitted to consider 'as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense' ") (emphasis in original) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); see also Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1865 (1988).
51. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 75-76.
52. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980); see also id at 433 ("any decision to
impose the death sentence [must] be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion"); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
53. This is not to say that the death penalty is never imposed arbitrarily or capriciously
when guidelines for discretionary sentencing exist, only that such arbitrary imposition occurs
less frequently. See Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986). The author
identified much unfettered discretion that remains. For example, prosecutors have complete
discretion whether to seek the death penalty or charge a capital offense. Id. at 799. In three
states the judge has discretion to override a jury's decision to give a life sentence and instead to
sentence the defendant to death. Id. at 820.
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The Court may strike an aggravating circumstance5 4 as unconstitution-
ally vague when it fails to channel the jury's discretion and provide a
"meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.""
III. The Importance of a Postconviction Review
in Capital Litigation
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Giarratano turned on the
Court's belief that a prisoner seeking postconviction relief has already
had a fair trial. Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed that the trial and direct
appeal of the judgment adequately assured the reliability of a death sen-
tence. He stated that "[t]he additional safeguards imposed by the Eighth
Amendment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we think, sufficient to
assure the reliability of the process by which the death penalty is im-
posed." 6 The plurality thus minimized the significance of the postcon-
viction proceeding in ensuring the reliability of the death sentence.
A state postconviction proceeding permits an inmate to challenge
the validity of his conviction or sentence. An inmate enters the postcon-
viction stage once a state appellate court affirms his conviction and the
United States Supreme Court decides not to grant any writ of certiorari
filed on the inmate's behalf. The inmate usually initiates a postconvic-
tion proceeding by petitioning in the trial court. If the trial court denies
the petition, the prisoner then moves through the state appellate court
system with his postconviction claims and may again apply for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. After completing his cycle in the
state system, the defendant may file his petition for relief in the federal
court system,57 beginning with the district court.58
State postconviction remedies, also called collateral reviews, include
modernized writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis, motions for new
trial and to set aside sentence, and postconviction hearing statutes. 9 The
54. An aggravating circumstance is used to distinguish capital murder from non-capital
murder. The death sentence cannot be imposed unless the jury finds at least one aggravating
factor. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
55. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring); see also God-
frey, 446 U.S. at 427; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
56. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2770-71 (1989).
57. Federal habeas corpus, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1983), is available to state
prisoners.
58. The hypothetical given here is neatly organized. In reality, an inmate may have sev-
eral claims that are pending in various courts at one time.
Charts illustrating postconviction proceedings in the court systems can be found in
Tabak, supra note 53, at 829; Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Postconviction Attorney Crisis on
Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. RFV. 513, 520 (1988); Wright & Miller, In Your Court: State Judi-
cial Federalism in Capital Cases, 18 URB. LAW. 659, 664-65 (1986).
59. The postconviction proceeding may also entail a stay of execution.
principal postconviction remedy available varies from state to state. For
example, the principal postconviction remedies in California, Virginia,
and Texas are based on the common law writ of habeas corpus. 6 Other
states, including Illinois, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Tennessee, have
statutory postconviction hearing acts.6 Nevada, Idaho, Oklahoma, and
South Carolina are among the states with principal postconviction reme-
dies derived from the 1966 version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Pro-
cedure Act.6 Other jurisdictions, such as Florida, Nebraska, and
Arkansas, have modelled their postconviction remedies on the federal
habeas corpus statute.63 Most states have additional postconviction rem-
edies in addition to a principal one."4
Postconviction remedies provide relief for constitutional, jurisdic-
tional, and fundamental errors. Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Pro-
cedure Act,65 an inmate may obtain relief for the following reasons:66 (1)
either the conviction obtained or the sentence imposed was based on an
unconstitutional statute; (2) the conviction obtained was based on con-
duct that is constitutionally protected; (3) the court lacked jurisdiction
over the inmate or the subject matter; (4) the sentence was not author-
ized by law; (5) evidence not previously heard requires vacation of the
conviction or the sentence in the interest of justice; (6) there is a signifi-
cant change in substantive or procedural law that, in the interest of jus-
tice, should be applied retrospectively; (7) the inmate's custody was
unlawful.67
Generally, the inmate bears the burden of proving his postconvic-
60. See D. WILKES, FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
App. A (1987 & Supp. 1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. In 1955, the National Commissioners of Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act for use by the states. In 1966, and again in 1980, the Commis-
sioners revised the Act. A copy of the 1966 version of the Act can be found in NATIONAL
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 266-77 (1966).
63. D. WILKES, supra note 60, App. A; 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1983).
64. In Arkansas, for example, other remedies include: statutory habeas corpus; common
law writ of error coram nobis; motion to correct sentence imposed in an illegal manner; motion
to correct unlawful sentence; and motion to reduce sentence. D. WILKES, supra note 60, App.
A.
65. UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § I (National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (1980)) [hereinafter UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT]
(available in NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS
333-42 (1982)).
66. The grounds enumerated in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act represent the
typical postconviction remedy. Some states' postconviction remedies, however, are more re-
strictive. For example, Georgia and Tennessee limit postconviction claims to those of constitu-
tional dimension. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-127(a) [9-14-42] (Harrison 1989); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-30-105 (1982).
67. UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 65, § 1.
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tion claims by a preponderance of the evidence.6" An inmate tradition-
ally may raise his claims at anytime.6 9 As a remedy, the inmate may
request the postconviction court to vacate the conviction or sentence and
to order a new trial or sentencing.
70
Postconviction relief is not a substitute for remedies at trial and on
direct review.71 A court may reject claims that were apparent in the trial
record and should have been raised in the direct appeal.72 The postcon-
viction proceeding, however, may address claims precluded on direct ap-
peal, such as claims based on facts outside the record,73 claims for
retrospective application of a new law,74 and claims not properly pre-
served by counsel's objection at trial.7' Remedies available on direct ap-
peal are subject to time limitations.76 Claims discovered after the
expiration of direct remedies will therefore be raised at the postconvic-
tion stage.
A. Examples of Capital Convictions and Sentences Overturned in State
Postconviction Cases
Many capital inmates have raised claims that warranted a new trial
or sentencing. This section discusses various claims that may arise in a
state postconviction review. These examples are based on actual cases in
which state courts have granted relief to capital inmates.
1. Unconstitutional Death Penalty Statutes
Capital inmates commonly raise constitutional claims in postconvic-
tion proceedings.77 A capital conviction or sentence is unconstitutional if
68. D. WILKES, supra note 60, at 8.
69. Id. at 5; see also UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 65,
§ 3(b). But see infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
70. D. WILKES, supra note 60, at 8.
71. "As a general rule, the grounds for postconviction relief are fewer in number and
narrower in scope than in direct remedy proceedings." Id. at 4; see also FLA. R. CRIM. PROC.
3.850 (West 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-21(1), -21(2), -5(3) (Cum. Supp. 1989); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-21-105 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.315(2) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1989)
(claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal are precluded from postconvic-
tion redress).
72. See UNIFORM POsT-CoNvICTION PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 65, § 12(b)(1) (relief
may be denied on ground of misuse of process).
73. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVlCTION REMEDIES 100 (1981 & Supp. 1989). The author re-
fers to claims in federal habeas review, but these claims are first raised in state postconviction
proceedings. See Beck v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 386 S.E.2d 349 (1989) (state postconviction court
learned for first time from sources outside the record that defendant was mentally retarded).
74. L. YACKLE, supra note 73, at 101.
75. Id. at 97.
76. D. WILKES, supra note 60, at 3.
77. See Tabak, supra note 53, at 822-30, for descriptions of typical postconviction cases
requiring reversal. For examples of capital cases reversed by the Florida Supreme Court, see
id at 836-37, and by other state courts, see Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91
[Vol. 18:211
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imposed under a statute that fails to meet the Eighth Amendment's relia-
bility standard. For example, a postconviction court may reverse a death
sentence because sections of a state's death penalty statute unconstitu-
tionally permit victim impact statements.7" A proscribed sentencing
form used by the jury may limit its consideration of mitigating evidence
and provide an improper basis for a death sentence.79 A new sentencing
hearing may be warranted for a death penalty that was based on an ag-
gravating circumstance later found invalid.80 A reviewing court may de-
termine that an inmate's death sentence is disproportionate to the
crime.8" Finally, retroactive application of new developments in capital
litigation may be the subject of postconviction relief.82
2. Constitutional Violations Occurring Before or During Trial
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the conviction or
sentence, the capital inmate may raise claims of constitutional violations
that occurred before or during trial. The exclusion of jurors who gener-
ally object to the death penalty may deprive the defendant of the sixth
amendment right to a cross-sectional and representative jury pool. 3 An-
other constitutional claim may result from failure to warn a defendant of
the right to remain silent during a psychiatric evaluation, such failure
violating the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.84 The
YALE L.J. 908, 920-22 (1982). For a survey of errors found by federal courts reviewing state
capital cases, see L. YACKLE, supra note 73, at 366-69.
78. Victim impact statements (VIS) refer to evidence about the character of the victim
and the impact of the victim's death on family members and other people. The use of VIS
shifts the focus from the defendant's culpability to the victim's character. The Supreme Court
held that evidence of victim impact statements is inadmissible. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496 (1987); see State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989).
79. See State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 548 A.2d 506 (1988).
80. See State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 775 P.2d 1069 (1989) (state failed to prove the two
prior convictions that were used as aggravating circumstances); Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d
915 (Tenn. 1988) (use of an invalid conviction to support an aggravating circumstance requires
new sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 210 (1989).
81. See Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1989) (court reduced sentence to life im-
prisonment based on evidence that defendant was a mildly retarded and mentally ill 18-year-
old, that he did nothing physically to assist the murder, and that the partner whom he assisted
did not receive a death sentence, but imprisonment for life).
82. See Mikenas v. Dugger, 519 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1988) (retroactive application of Hitch-
cock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)); Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1987) (retro-
active application of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Exparte Williams, 748 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1988) (improper
disqualification of a juror); Ex parte Hughes, 728 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1987) (same); see also
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (Supreme Court limited removal for cause to a
venire member who explicitly indicated that she would automatically vote against a death
sentence or could not remain impartial in determining the guilt or innocence of defendant with
the knowledge that conviction might lead to a death sentence.).
84. See Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (rex. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 864
(1985).
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state's use of "impermissibly suggestive" investigative procedures may
constitute a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
8 5
3. Prejudicial Jury Instructions and Jury Misconduct
Postconviction claims that the trial court gave improper jury in-
structions may require the reversal of a capital conviction or sentence.
Jury instructions may limit the consideration of nonstatutory mitigating
evidence and render any resulting death sentence unreliable.86 Mention-
ing the governor's power to commute a death sentence to life in the jury
instructions may factor improperly into the jury's deliberation. 7 In-
structions that the jury "should" recommend death if the aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating evidence may improperly compel the
jury to impose the death sentence.8 8
A postconviction court may find error if essential information is
omitted from the jury instructions. A defendant is entitled to a new trial
if the court fails to instruct the jury on all of the elements required for
finding a particular capital offense.8 9 The court may neglect to tell the
jurors that they could recommend a life sentence even on finding a statu-
tory aggravating circumstance.90
Finally, jury misconduct that affects jury deliberations and the deci-
sion to impose a death sentence may surface at the postconviction stage.
For example, a juror's erroneous statement of the law may constitute
prejudicial juror misconduct. 91
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Another source of postconviction claims is prosecutorial misconduct
discovered after the affirmance of the death sentence. The defendant
may learn that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence92 or that
85. See Ex parte Brandley, 281 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1989).
86. See O'Callaghan v. State, 542 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1989) (court instructed the jury to
consider only statutory mitigating evidence); Waterhouse v. State, 522 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1988)
(same), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 123 (1989); Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1987)
(same), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988); Downs v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1987)
(same); Morgan v. State, 515 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1987) (same), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988).
87. See People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989) (court
found such instruction to be prejudicially misleading, inviting the jury to be influenced by
speculative and improper consideration).
88. See Williams v. State, 525 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1988).
89. See State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 691 P.2d 710 (1984) (jury instructions on felony
murder did not define elements of the underlying felony).
90. See Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 252 Ga. 113, 311 S.E.2d 828 (1984).
91. See In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 708 P.2d 1260, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1986) (juror
convinced other jury members that, as a former police officer, he knew the law).
92. See Roman v. State, 528 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1988) (state failed to disclose exculpatory
pretrial testimony of the witness); Ex parte Womack, 541 So. 2d 47 (Ala. 1988) (state sup-
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the prosecutor knowingly relied on perjured testimony.93 The defendant
may object to a prosecutor's argument that distorts constitutional re-
quirements.94 Incorrect information that a death sentence is not com-
mutable may influence a jury's decision.95 The prosecutor may use a
witness to produce inadmissible victim impact evidence.96
5. Prejudicial Evidentiary Errors
A trial court's wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence may
taint a death sentence. The court's refusal to permit the defense counsel
to present relevant mitigating evidence may produce an unreliable death
sentence.97 The court may allow anticipatory rebuttal of mitigating evi-
dence by the prosecution even without the introduction of such mitigat-
ing evidence by the defense. 98 The defendant may challenge a judge who
refuses to consider mitigating evidence in his decision to sentence the
defendant to death. 99 For the same reason, a judge's override of a jury's
recommendation of a life sentence may be inappropriate when the judge
did not consider the mitigating evidence."c°
6. Newly Discovered Facts or Evidence
New facts or evidence indicating an erroneous conviction or sen-
tence may be revealed at the postconviction stage. For example, a sus-
pect's confession to a murder may exculpate an inmate on death row.101
Ordinarily, the remedy for newly discovered evidence is a motion for a
pressed police reports indicating inconsistent statements of witnesses, evidence of a witness'
attempt to recant grand jury testimony that implicated the defendant, and a memorandum
containing information that state witnesses had committed the crime).
93. See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
94. See Thompson v. Aiken, 281 S.C. 239, 315 S.E.2d 110 (1984) (prosecutor's statement
of his personal opinion for seeking death penalty may have unduly influenced jury).
95. See Jones v. State, 101 Nev. 573, 707 P.2d 1128 (1985) (statements that parole board
may commute sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, but not a death
sentence, may have led jury to impose death sentence).
96. See Jackson v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989) (prosecutor asked supervising
sheriff about reputation of deceased officer and impact of his death on his colleagues).
97. See Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1988); Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901 (Fla.
1987); Morgan v. State, 515 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1987); McCrae v. State, 510 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1987); Harvard v. State, 486 So. 2d 537 (Fla.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 863 (1986).
98. See Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1981).
99. See Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1989); Cooper v. Dugger, 526 So. 2d 900 (Fla.
1988); Chaffee v. State, 294 S.C. 88, 362 S.E.2d 875 (1987).
100. See Zeigler v. Dugger, 524 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1988).
101. See State v. Scott, 710 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1986). The presence of innocent people on
death row is not uncommon. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capi-
tal Cases, 40 STAN. L. Rnv. 21 (1987); Malcolm, Tainted Trials Stir Fears of Wrongful Execu-
tions, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1989, at Al; Moran and Ellis, One Error Out of 280 Is Not Bad,
Unless You're an Undiscovered RandallAdams, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, pt. II, at 8; Pull the
Plug on the Death Penalty, Oakland Tribune, Mar. 8, 1989, at C6.
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new trial that is made at trial or during the appeal."' 2 This remedy re-
quires, however, that the motion be made within a specific time frame."°3
When the time period for filing a motion for new trial expires, the inmate
is left only with postconviction remedies to present new exculpatory
evidence. 104
A postconviction review of newly discovered evidence may require a
new trial. Randall Dale Adams, the subject of The Thin Blue Line docu-
mentary, 0 5 spent twelve years in prison, five of which were on death
row, for a murder he did not commit.10 6 A subsequent hearing revealed
evidence warranting a new trial. James Richardson made similar head-
lines.'07 He was convicted and initially sentenced to death for poisoning
his seven children. Nearly two decades later, his attorney unearthed evi-
dence regarding the actual timing of the murder. The murder occurred
several hours earlier than originally believed, at a time when Richardson
was eight miles away from the murder site. This evidence led to the
postconviction reversal of Richardson's conviction. 10
Z Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised routinely at a post-
102. D. WILKES, supra note 60, at 10.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 11.
105. The Thin Blue Line (Miramax 1988).
106. Randall Adams was sentenced to death in 1977. The Governor of Texas commuted
his sentence to life. The Supreme Court affirmed Adams's conviction in 1981. The documen-
tary ifim assisted Adams in gaining a postconviction hearing in 1989. In Ex parte Adams, 768
S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), the court found that the state's failure to correct perjurious
testimony of a witness and to disclose improper coaching of a witness by police violated Ad-
ams's right to a fair trial. The court ordered a new trial, but the state decided not to prosecute
in light of the timely confession of David Harris to the murder for which Adams was accused.
See Johnson, Freed From the Specter of Death, Austin American-Statesman, May 7, 1989, at
CIO; Belkin, Dallas Will Not Retry Man in Killing of Officer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1989, at
A6, col. 2; Belkin, Dallas Frees Man in Verdict Appeal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at A9, col.
1; Kennedy & Cerone, Conviction Set Aside for "Thin Blue Line" Character, L.A. Times, Mar.
2, 1989, pt. I, at 1; Pasztor, Confession, Judge's Plea Fail to Win Adams Parole, Dallas Times
Herald, Feb. 26, 1989, at Al; Applebome, Texas Judge Says He'll Urge a New Trial in 1976
Murder, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1988, at A8, col. 1; Applebome, Texas Has Chance to Seek New
Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at A14, col. I; Applebome, Verdict in 1976 Murder Still
Raising Questions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1988, at A8.
107. James Richardson was saved from execution when the United States Supreme Court
invalidated all existing death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Richardson remained imprisoned for an additional sixteen years before the discovery of evi-
dence leading to his release. See Johnson, supra note 106, at ClO; Florida Won't Retry Man in
Poisoning Case, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at A8, col. 5; After 21 Years, Man is Freed in Poison
Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at A1O, col. 3.
108. See supra note 107.
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conviction hearing."°9 Such claims may stem from counsel's failure to
investigate and present mitigating evidence,"' the failure to disqualify a
biased juror on voir dire, or the failure to make a timely objection that
will provide a basis for later appeals.' 11 To obtain relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant must
show not only the source of counsers error, but also actual prejudice
resulting from that error." 2 The additional burden of showing actual
prejudice increases the difficulty of proving claims of ineffective coun-
sel.' 13 State postconviction courts, however, have granted relief." 4 The
failure to present any mitigating evidence at a defendant's sentencing
hearing may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 115 Likewise,
counsel may have a conflict of interest which affects his representation of
the inmate. 16 A defense counsel's failure to obtain an independent psy-
109. Robbins, supra note 2, at 24-25; see A.B.A. Amicus Curiae Brief at 19-21, Murray v.
Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411) [hereinafter ABA Amicus] (claims of ineffec-
tive assistance normally require investigation beyond the record and thus can only be raised in
postconviction review); American Civil Liberties Union Amicus Curiae Brief at 4-5, Giar-
ratano (No. 88-411) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus] (Virginia limits direct appellate review of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to those in which matter is fully contained in the rec-
ord; all other claims of counsel ineffectiveness are limited to the postconviction proceeding).
Moreover, an ineffective counsel claim is not raised on direct appeal because the same attorney
usually represents the defendant both at trial and on direct appeal. Id at 6. A defense attor-
ney is unlikely to raise any claim of her own ineffectiveness. Id. See infra note 159-70 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the prevalence of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
capital cases.
110. One commentator has explained:
Although a capital defendant might have mitigating evidence that could persuade a
judge or jury not to impose death, a death sentence will not appear unprincipled or
arbitrary on the record where such evidence is not presented.... The adequacy of
counsel's preparation, which does not appear on the record of a trial, is at least as
important as the adequacy of counsel's presentation, which does appear.
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 319 (1983) (emphasis in original).
111. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
112. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
113. See Goodpaster, supra note 110, at 345-52; Hengstler, Attorneys for the Damned,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 59-60; Tabak, supra note 53, at 806-08; Comment, Washington v.
Strickland, Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 CoLUM. L. REv.
1544 (1983); Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 461 (1987).
114. See State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 691 P.2d 689 (1984); State v. Fisher, 152 Ariz.
116, 730 P.2d 825 (1986); People v. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 729 P.2d 839, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404
(1987); Zant v. Cook, 259 Ga. 299, 379 S.E.2d 780 (1989); Smith v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1042
(Ind. 1987); State v. Taylor, 535 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. App. 1989); State ex rel Busby v. Butler,
538 So. 2d 164 (La. 1988).
115. See In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989); Bassett v.
State, 541 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1989); Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1989); Wilson v. State,
771 P.2d 583 (Nev. 1989).
116. See In re Easley, 46 Cal. 3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1988); Barclay v.
Wainwright, 444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984); Dougan v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1984).
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chiatric evaluation of the defendant may amount to ineffectiveness.
11 7
Finally, a postconviction court may decide that the appellate counsel
failed to provide effective assistance."1 8
B. Some Claims Will Be Heard for the First Time in the Postconviction
Proceeding
In most states, the state appellate court automatically reviews any
capital case that results in a death sentence. Direct review alone, how-
ever, cannot assure the reliability of a death sentence because not all
valid claims are raised on direct appeal. These valid claims, many of
which were described in the previous section, provide a basis for over-
turning a capital conviction or sentence.
In addition to the preclusion of claims on substantive grounds, state
procedures may prevent claims from being heard on direct appeal. Vir-
ginia, like many other states,' 19 has a contemporaneous objection rule
which precludes the review of any issue that was not preserved by the
defense counsel's objection, or provision of reasons for any objection,
raised at the trial.1 2 Unlike the appellate court, the postconviction court
may address these precluded claims if it finds that counsel was ineffective
in failing to preserve the issue. Virginia has another procedural device
that limits a direct review only to those issues that are assigned as errors,
and not to the entire trial record.121 The court will not review the record
to assure the accuracy of a death sentence, but only to resolve the appel-
late claims of error.
IV. The Need for Representation in a Postconviction
Proceeding
The inmate's right to postconviction remedies is meaningless with-
out representation by counsel. Petitioning and preparing for a postcon-
viction proceeding require a specialized knowledge of the procedural and
substantive rules of capital litigation.122 Postconviction capital litigation
117. See State v. Michael, 530 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1988); Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 371
S.E.2d 647 (1988).
118. See Tyler v. State, 507 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
119. Robbins, supra note 2, at 59 (all states have contemporaneous objection rule or other
procedural bars); see, eg., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 841 (West Cum. Supp. 1990);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 (a), (b) (1988); see also Cochran v. State, 548 So. 2d 1062 (Ala.
1989); Rose v. State, 461 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1984); Collier v. Francis, 251 Ga. 512, 307 S.E.2d 485
(1983); In re Hill, 460 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1984).
120. ACLU Amicus, supra note 109, at 1-2 (courts have refused to address claims raised by
capital defendants on direct appeal on the ground that counsel failed to preserve or raise the
issue at trial); see R. VA. Sup. Cr. 5.25 (1989).
121. ACLU Amicus, supra note 109, at 2-3; see also R. VA. Sup. Cr. 5.17(c) (1989); LA.
CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 920 (West 1984).
122. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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is complex and difficult for many attorneys. 123 The expectation that an
inmate, without the schooling or experience of a lawyer, can master what
eludes most attorneys is absurd. 124
The myriad state and federal procedural rules for raising postcon-
viction claims further complicate capital litigation. Failure to adhere to
a procedural rule may cost the inmate his claims in both the state and the
federal courts. Strict state rules delineating the procedure for raising
postconviction claims increase the need for the assistance of counsel.
Before the inmate petitions for relief, he must choose the most advanta-
geous and appropriate postconviction remedy. Some states have a wide
assortment of postconviction remedies.
121
Next, the petitioner must file his petition with the proper court.
Some states require that the petition be filed with the convicting trial
court,126 while others direct the petitioner to file with an appellate court
or the highest state court.1 27 In Virginia, the convicting court and the
supreme court have original jurisdiction over postconviction petitioners
in criminal cases.1 28 Thus, a petition erroneously filed in the Virginia
Court of Appeals is subject to dismissal.
129
States have adopted summary procedures for disposing of postcon-
viction applications. To obtain a hearing, the petitioner must make a
123. Tabak, supra note 53, at 531-43. While serving as a judge on the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, John Godbold observed that "[tiaking a habeas case is not something most
lawyers want to do. In the first place, it's hard. It is the most complex area of the law I deal
with. In the second place, it's often done on an emergency basis." Mikva & Godbold, Repre-
senting Death Row: A Dialogue between Judge Abner J Mikva and Judge John C. Godbold
"You Don't Have to Be a Bleeding Heart," HUMAN RIGHTS, Winter 1987, at 24.
To assist attorneys, the American Bar Association Postconviction Death Penalty Repre-
sentation Project prepared a habeas corpus handbook, a directory of experienced lawyers, and
sample pleadings. Blodgett, Death Row Inmates Can't Find Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987,
at 58.
124. It has been observed that
[postconviction] capital cases by their nature are more factually and legally complex
and demanding of legal expertise than any other cases, while the frequent need to
litigate such cases quickly under the threat of an unstayed execution, the especially
confining custodial constraints placed on death row inmates in most prisons, and the
psychological pressures associated with an impending execution render condemned
prisoners less capable.., of adequately representing themselves.
L. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 83-84 (1981).
125. For example, the remedies available in Florida include statutory relief, a common law
writ of error coram nobis, a writ of habeas corpus under the state constitution, and motions for
reviewing sentences. Texas is unique, possessing one exclusive postconviction measure for
felons and capital defendants. D. WILKEs, supra note 60, App. A.
126. See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRIM. PROC. 32.4(a) (West 1990).
127. See, eg., WASH. R. APP. PROC. 16.3(c) (1977).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(1) (1983).
129. Bullock v. Dept. of Corrections, 1 Va. App. 70, 334 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1023 (1985).
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substantial showing of a constitutional violation or risk dismissal. '30 In
Arkansas, a petitioner cannot apply for postconviction relief without
prior approval from the state supreme court. 131 Illinois requires the
court to act on a postconviction petition within thirty days of receipt of
the petition.
132
Some state statutes limit the defendant to a single petition.1 33 Such
limitations jeopardize the defendant's chances for postconviction relief.
The inexperienced inmate must seek and develop all available claims in
his first petition or waive them. 3
States not only limit the number of petitions, but require petitions to
be filed within a prescribed time period.1 35 For example, Nevada statuto-
rily requires that, in the absence of good cause, an inmate file for post-
conviction relief within one year of the affirmance of a death sentence. 
36
Idaho requires a capital inmate to file for postconviction relief within
forty-two days from the fling of the death sentence. 137 In Virginia, state
law permits the state to execute an inmate as early as thirty days follow-
ing his conviction,1 38 providing little time for the inmate to seek a stay of
130. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973); see also People v. How-
ard, 94 Ill. App. 3d 797, 801, 419 N.E.2d 702, 705 (1981) (citing People v. Farnsley, 53 Ill. 2d
537, 549, 293 N.E.2d 600, 608 (1973)); UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, supra
note 65, § 9 (provision for summary disposition, leaving question of a hearing to the discretion
of the court.)
The procedure in Maryland strives to be fair, providing petitioner with counsel and a
hearing as a matter of right for his first postconviction application. MD. CRIM. LAW CODE
ANN. art. 27 § 654A(f) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
131. ARK. R. CRiM. PROC. 37.2(a) (1989); see Wilson v. State, 285 Ark. 271, 686 S.W.2d
414 (1985) (postconviction petition dismissed because the defendant failed to obtain prior per-
mission from the Supreme Court); Swindler v. State, 272 Ark. 340, 617 S.W.2d 1 (same), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1989); cf. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 177.380(6) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1989) (60 days).
133. See ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 20(b) (1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4234(F) (West
1989); ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 37.2(b) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-21-105 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 177.380(3) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1989); UTAH R. CIV. PROC. 65B(i)(4) (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)2 (1983); cf MD. CRM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27 § 645(a)(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1989) (inmate limited to two petitions).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. Several states have adopted statutes of limitations that begin running at the end of the
direct appellate review. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 177.315(3) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1989) (one
year); ALA. TEMP. R. CRIM. PROC. 20.2(c) (1989) (two years); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.850
(West 1989) (same); ARK. R. CRaM. PROC. 37.2(c) (1989) (three years); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-39-5(2) (Cum. Supp. 1989) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-102 (1989) (five years
from date of conviction); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1989) (ten
years).
136. NEV. REv. STAT. § 177.315(3) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1989).
137. IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(3) (1987) (upheld in State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d
678 (1988)). Noncapital inmates have a statute of limitations of five years. Id. § 19-4902.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232 (1983); see Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513
(E.D. Va. 1986).
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execution or to petition for postconviction relief. The inmate in Florida
must file all postconviction motions within thirty days from the date on
which the governor signs the death warrant.13 9 In Arizona, a court can-
not grant a stay of execution unless the inmate requests the stay at least
ninety days before the date of execution. 14°
These time limitations alone remain an obstacle for the unrepre-
sented inmate in applying for state postconviction relief. The district
court in Giarratano remarked, "Even assuming that a death row inmate
would be intellectually capable of such a task, it is beyond cavil that a
prisoner unversed in the law and methods of legal research would need
much more time than a trained lawyer to explore his case." 14'
Current federal habeas corpus practices emphasize the need for
assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings. A federal
habeas proceeding cannot make up for claims overlooked at the state
postconviction review because the outcome of that state review deter-
mines the extent of the federal court's habeas review. Before an inmate
can present any claims to a federal postconviction court, the inmate must
exhaust all state remedies. 142 Procedural default1 43 or an independent-
state-ground ruling in a state postconviction proceeding may preclude
federal habeas review of those issues dismissed in the state postconviction
review. 1" The federal court, in deciding issues pursuant to a habeas peti-
tion, must presume that the state's factual findings are correct. 145
139. FLA. R. CRIM. PRoc. 3.851(a) (West 1989). In Utah, the court will not accept an
application for postconviction relief within 30 days of the scheduled execution. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-31.2 (1987). These time constraints cause hardship because "[p]etitioners often
do not file a collateral attack until the warrant has been signed.. . ." Wright & Miller, supra
note 58, at 672.
140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4234(D) (1989). In addition, a court will not grant a
stay of execution unless the defendant presents a substantial claim that will probably be deter-
mined in the applicant's favor and result in a new trial. Id
141. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513 (citation omitted).
142. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1983); see Catz, Federal
Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: Need for a Preclusion Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. DA-
vis L. REV. 1177 (1985); Robbins, supra note 2, at 104-26.
143. A procedural default occurs when the defendant's failure to adhere to procedural
rules precluded the appellate or postconviction court from reviewing his claims. For example,
procedural default can result from the defendant's failure to make a timely objection at trial or
to raise a claim within the prescribed time period.
144. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (state dismissal based on failure to assign
errors on direct appeal bars federal review); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (state dismissal
based on lack of contemporaneous objection bars federal review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977) (same); see also Robbins, supra note 2, at 59-104; Robson & Mello, Ariadne's
Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and In-
dependent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REV. 87 (1988); Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1120 (1986).
145. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1983). The presump-
tion may not attach if one of eight enumerated exceptions applies. Id.
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The nature of state postconviction remedies imposes other limita-
tions on federal review. For example, the federal court will not relitigate
a claim objecting to the admission of evidence as a fourth amendment
"search and seizure" violation.146 In addition, the inmate needs to raise
all claims in the first habeas petition because a federal court may dismiss
successive petitions on grounds of an abuse of the writ. 47 Finally, the
filing of federal habeas petition is subject also to time limitations because
federal circuit courts have adopted summary procedures to expedite fed-
eral habeas petitions. 48 In some cases these summary procedures pro-
vide less time for capital cases than for noncapital cases.
149
Inadequate trial representation further hinders the inmate's in pro
per representation in the state postconviction proceeding."' An Ameri-
can Bar Association task force on death penalty habeas corpus reports
that "[i]t is simply unrealistic to expect the [posteonviction] system to
operate better when its most fundamental component-informed, dili-
gent, and effective advocacy-is missing at the trial level."1'' Similarly,
the Guidelines for Appointment note that "poor performance by trial
counsel cannot be ignored on the theory that appellate or postconviction
review will cure trial level error; in several instances deficient perform-
ance has not led to reversal."'
' 5 2
The problems that plague the general criminal defense system for
indigents, including unmanageable caseloads, inadequate funds, and lack
of supervision or support for new attorneys,1 53 are particularly acute in
146. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Court,
Rule 9(b) (1983); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); see Robbins, supra note 2, at
126-43.
148. A summary procedure was first recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court in Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expedited the
briefing and scheduling of arguments for cases. See Tabak, supra note 53, at 834-38 and Mello,
supra note 58, at 546-48 for discussions of Barefoot and of the rules of the Third and Fifth
Circuit Courts of Appeals allowing both the district court's ruling and the appellate court's
disposition of a case to occur on the same day. Robbins, supra note 2, at 175-96 also discusses
Barefoot. See Tabak, supra note 53, at 834-38 for a discussion concerning the lack of time for
preparing for federal habeas petitions.
149. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Coun-
sel in Death Penalty Cases 34 (1989) [hereinafter Guidelines for Appointment]; Mello, supra
note 58, at 547; Tabak, supra note 53, at 835.
150. Robbins, supra note 2, at 18-26; see Hengstler, supra note 113, at 58 for "horror sto-
ries of death cases bungled by trial counsel" shared by postconviction lawyers.
151. Robbins, supra note 2, at 25.
152. Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149, at 33 (citation omitted).
153. American Bar Association, Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society,
Criminal Justice in Crisis 39-43, 52-54 (1988) (identifies the indigent criminal defense service as
one of six major problems in today's criminal justice system).
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capital defense representation.154 Capital litigation requires specialized
knowledge"' and familiarity with constant changes in the law. 156 The
prevalence of incompetent trial representation in capital cases prompted
the American Bar Association to publish its Guidelines for Appointment
and establish resource centers in thirteen states. 5 7 The Guidelines for
Appointment explain that
death penalty cases have become so specialized that defense coun-
sel has duties and functions definably different from those of coun-
sel in ordinary criminal cases.... At every stage of a capital case,
counsel must be aware of specialized and frequently changing legal
principles and rules, and be able to develop strategies applying
them in the pressure-filled environment of high-stakes, complex
litigation."18
Despite the fact that capital litigation is such a specialized field,
most states, including Virginia, 159 appoint trial attorneys without regard
to their experience or abilities."16  "'Sometimes what the indigent gets is
the town drunk,'... '[or w]hatever lawyer happens to be sitting in front
.... , ,161 The National Law Journal, in a six-month study of the death
penalty in the South, found that "more than half of the defense counsel
questioned... said they were handling their first capital trials when their
154. Tabak, supra note 53, at 801-10. "Attorney error [in capital cases] is often the result
of systemic problems, not individual deficiency." Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149,
at 35.
155. The Guidelines for Appointment emphasizes sophisticated jury selection techniques,
utilization of expert witnesses and evidence, effective cross-examination, substantial pretrial
investigation, and coordination and integration of the evidence presented during the guilt
phase and the penalty phase. Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149, at 31-32; see also
Goodpaster, supra note 110, at 317-39.
156. In 1987, for example, the United States Supreme Court handed down ten cases.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Capital Punishment 1987, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 2-3
(1988) [hereinafter Capital Punishment 19871. In 1989, the Court decided nine cases.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 2 (Mar. 1, 1989).
157. How Good are Death Row Lawyers?, HUMAN RIGHTS, Spring 1989, at 37 [hereinafter
How Good Are Death Row Lawyers?].
158. Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149, at 31 (citation omitted).
159. Virginia lacks either specific requirements or standards for appointing counsel to rep-
resent capital defendants. ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at 25.
160. "In many states, there is no standard for the appointment of counsel. Lawyers are
inexperienced or don't have resources. Many of the people on death row are poorly served."
How Good are Death Row Lawyers?, supra note 157, at 37. Congress recognized this need for
qualified counsel in capital cases and, in its enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
specified minimum qualifications for a trial attorney representing an inmate subject to the
death penalty. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94 (1989). The Guidelines
for Appointment recommends a standard of attorney eligibility at all stages of capital litigation
and the appointment of two qualified counsel to one capital case. Guidelines for Appointment,
supra note 149, at 41-44, 55-64.
161. Hengstler, supra note 113, at 58 (quoting Stephen Bright of the Southern Prisoners'
Defense Committee and George Kendall of the American Civil Liberties Union, respectively.)
Fall 19901
232 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:211
clients, now on death row, were convicted." '162
Insufficient attorney compensation and inadequate funding for cleri-
cal, investigative, or expert witness assistance 163 further undermine the
quality of representation. 16 A capital case runs three-and-a-half times
longer than a noncapital case and thus consumes more attorney hours. 165
The one thousand dollar cap on attorney fees in Mississippi typically rep-
resented an hourly rate of five dollars or less,' 66 leading the National
Law Journal to conclude that "[w]holly unrealistic statutory fee limits on
defense representation... act as disincentives to thorough trial investiga-
tion and preparation."' 67 Even in states providing for "reasonable fees,"
the specific amount is left to the discretion of the trial judge and is "often
small or non-existent."' 68 Virginia is no exception, providing attorney
fees that are among the lowest in the country.' 69 Inadequate funding of
the defense representation in capital cases increases the risk of erroneous
death sentences.'
70
Without counsel, "[t]he isolation of death row means that even a
condemned inmate with the skills of Clarence Darrow could not mount a
proper postconviction effort."' 17 1 Death row inmates lack the resources
or freedom adequately to prepare postconviction claims.' 7 2 To conduct a
postconviction investigation of a meritorious claim, a petitioner requires
access to a law library, updated information on legal changes, and sup-
162. Fatal Defense, supra note 48, at 30. Fatal Defense discusses the lack of training for
trial counsel and the lack of standards for appointing counsel in capital cases. Id. at 31, 38, 41,
44.
163. Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149, at 73-75; Robbins, supra note 2, at 37.
Congress acknowledged this need by providing for "reasonable compensation" for the attorney
for her services as well as for other necessary services such as clerical and investigative assist-
ance in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-
94 (1989).
164. Robbins, supra note 2, at 33-37. A Texas study indicated that 93 percent of capital
inmates with appointed counsel were convicted as compared to 65 percent of inmates with
retained counsel. In addition, 79 percent of the inmates with appointed counsel received the
death sentence as compared to 55 percent of the inmates represented by retained counsel.
Tabak, supra note 53, at 828.
165. Comment, The Cost of Taking A Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.
C. DAvis L. REv. 1221, 1258; see iad at 1245-66 for an explanation of why capital cases
require more expenses, time, and attorney labor than noncapital cases.
166. Fatal Defense, supra note 48, at 33. For a chart comparing the method of compensa-
tion among eight states, see id at 32.
167. Id at 30.
168. Wilson & Spangenberg, State Post-Conviction Representation of Defendants Sentenced
to Death, 72 JUDICATURE 331, 335-36 (1989).
169. ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at 24-25 (citing Spangenberg Group, Study of Repre-
sentation in Capital Cases in Virginia 25 (1988)).
170. Robbins, supra note 2, at 24 (inadequate trial representation increased the risk of
flawed conviction or sentence); see also Guidelines for Appointment, supra note 149, at 79-83.
171. Mello, supra note 58, at 548.
172. Id. at 543-46.
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port from outside the prison, including experts (forensic and psychiatric,
for example), prior counsel and witnesses, and materials maintained in
the trial court (such as records, evidence, and exhibits).17 In addition,
claims that are based on facts or evidence outside the trial record require
further investigation. These claims include the underrepresentation of
women and blacks in the jury pool, the withholding of exculpatory evi-
dence by the prosecutor, and ineffective assistance of counsel.174 An in-
adequate investigation by the trial attorney and an incomplete trial
record frequently compound the need for further investigation of post-
conviction claims.
The need to cope with an impending execution impedes the inmate's
ability to represent himself. Scholars have recognized that life on death
row can produce mental anguish or even mental illness.175 In his dissent
in Giarratano, Justice Stevens noted the district court's finding" 'that an
inmate preparing himself and his family for impending death is incapable
of performing the mental functions necessary to adequately pursue his
claims.' q1176
Inmates on death row often struggle with mental or emotional im-
pairments, illiteracy, and poverty. 177 In Virginia, twenty-four of fifty-
seven prisoners on death row had ninth grade education or less. 178 Na-
tionwide, 20.5 percent of the inmates on death row had not passed the
eighth grade and an additional 36.5 percent had not completed high
school. 179 Indigency is even more widespread, affecting 99.5 percent of
prisoners on death row."'
Not surprisingly, a represented defendant has greater chances for
relief than a pro se defendant. "In the capital setting, the difference [of
representation] can mean the difference between life or death." ' One
attorney estimated that represented inmates obtained relief in fifty per-
173. Id.
174. ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at 15-24 (descriptions of cases in which the defense
raised meritorious constitutional claims. These claims required the investigation and develop-
ment of facts and evidence outside of the trial records. Without the assistance of counsel,
inmates in prison could not have uncovered these claims).
175. Professor Mello suggests Ford v. Wainwright, 447 U.S. 399 (1986) as an illustration of
the mental deterioration of an inmate on death row. Mello, supra note 58, at 551 n.250. Pro-
fessor Mello cites additional sources. It at 551 n.251; see also Bluestone & McGahee, Reac-
tion to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962);
Gallemore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PsY-
CHIATRY 167 (1972); Johnson, Under Sentence of Death The Psychology of Death Row Con-
finement, 5 L. & PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1979).
176. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2780 (1989) (quoting Giarratano v. Murray,
668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986)).
177. Mello, supra note 58, at 548-53.
178. ACLU Amicus, supra note 109, at 20 n.7.
179. Capital Punishment 1987, supra note 156, at 7.
180. Mikva & Godbold, supra note 123, at 23.
181. Mello, supra note 58, at 531.
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cent of postconviction cases. 182 Counselled petitioners receive postcon-
viction relief fifteen times more often than pro se petitioners. 8 3
The high rate of capital sentences overturned on federal habeas re-
view is perhaps the greatest evidence of the capital inmate's need for ap-
pointed counsel in the state postconviction proceeding, 8 4 especially in
light of current discussions to limit federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 85
Data collected over a ten-year period ending in 1987 indicate that 1,034
out of 3,163 death sentences were disposed of by the federal court as a
result of statutes struck down on appeal, vacated sentences or convic-
tions, and commuted sentences. 8 6 One commentator calculated that
sixty to eighty-five percent of capital cases were reversed compared to 6.5
percent for other criminal convictions during the same time period.1
8 7
The fact that federal courts frequently overturn postconviction decisions
by state courts shows that the state courts are not doing their share in
enforcing federal constitutional rights.' The inadequacy of such state
postconviction remedies in ensuring the reliability of death sentences ne-
cessitates the appointment of counsel in the state postconviction
proceeding.
States such as Virginia' 89 cannot continue to rely on volunteer attor-
neys to provide postconviction representation without imposing a statu-
tory requirement for appointed counsel.190 The nationwide shortage of
182. Blodgett, supra note 123, at 58.
183. Mello, supra note 58, at 565-66; Wright & Miller, supra note 58, at 670. Miller and
Wright also point out that this increase may also reflect the counsel's ability to screen out
frivolous claims. Id. at 670 n.32.
184. In his dissent in Giarratano, Justice Stevens recognized the high incidence of cases
overturned by the federal courts. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2778 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Few statistics exist about state postconviction reviews.
185. Lavelle, Habeas Reform Proposal Passed, Nat'l L.J., July 30, 1990, at 3; Fatal De-
fense, supra note 48, at 44; see also Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal (Aug. 23,
1989), for the proposal recommended by a committee appointed by Justice Rehnquist.
186. Capital Punishment 1987, supra note 156, at 9.
Professor Anthony Amsterdam observed that "between 1976 and 1983, the federal courts
of appeals decided a total of 41 capital habeas appeals and had ruled in favor of the condemned
inmate in 30, or 73.2 percent, of them . . . ." Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis, HUMAN
RIGHTS, Winter 1987, at 15; see also Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death Sentenced
Inmates, 42 REc. A. B. CrrY N.Y. 859, 873-74 (1987); Wright & Miller, supra note 58, at 669.
187. Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); see Tabak,
supra note 53, at 521 (73.2 percent success rate for capital inmates compared to 6.5 percent for
ordinary criminal defendants).
188. Wright & Miller, supra note 58, at 672-87; Yackle, The Misadventures of State Post-
conviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359 (1987).
189. Virginia is among seven states that rely primarily on volunteer counsel for postconvic-
tion representation. Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 168, at 335.
190. Wilson and Spangenberg concluded from their studies that "a system of volunteer
counsel cannot be a long-term solution .... The pool of volunteer lawyers cannot expand
rapidly enough to meet the growing need." Id. at 337.
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volunteer attorneys to represent inmates on death row is well-docu-
mented. 191 Attorneys are deterred from volunteering their services by
the complexity of cases, the lack of support and guidance, the enormous
time commitment, and the money and emotional energy involved in capi-
tal postconviction litigation. 192 One survey estimated that taking one
capital case through the state postconviction proceeding alone requires
one-fifth to one-fourth of a private attorney's yearly workload. 93 An-
other survey indicated that attorneys in Virginia spent an average of 992
hours and $3686 in each state postconviction capital case.194 Judge
Godbold, in an effort to recruit volunteers to represent capital inmates in
postconviction proceedings, warned attorneys:
But don't say that I promised you a rose garden. A death
penalty case will be as difficult and demanding litigation as you will
ever participate in. It will require a substantial investment of time.
The law is difficult. It's complex. It changes every week. Re-
search is tough. The case will be emotionally draining no matter
how hard you steel yourself against it. 
195
V. Conclusion
The eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment compels the review of individual death sentences for reliability.
The finality of the death penalty further warrants the state's interest in an
execution reasonably free from errors. The state postconviction proceed-
ing is a vital step in ensuring the reliability of death sentences. The state
review process remedies constitutional claims not heard at trial or on
direct appeal and reinforces the accuracy of a death sentence as an ap-
propriate punishment. The state postconviction review therefore serves a
191. See Baske, An Urgent Plea for Help from the Alabama State Bar, 47 ALA. LAW. 14
(1986); Blodgett, supra note 123, at 58; Kroll, Deathwatch, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1987, at 25;
Tabak, supra note 53, at 829-34; Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 168, at 337; Oliver, Hard
Work, Low Pay; Death Row: Few Lawyers for Big Task, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 1988, pt. I, at 1,
col. 1; Terry, Lawyers Scramble to Fill Void in Death Row Appeals, Wash. Post, July 24, 1988,
at All; Taylor, Many Are Called, Many Respond, Natl L.J., May 23, 1988, at 15; see also
Murray v. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. 511, 515 (E.D. Va. 1986) (district court noted the lack of
volunteer counsel for state postconviction representation of capital inmates).
Recognizing the severity of the problem, the American Bar Association established the
Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project to recruit ABA members to represent
indigent death row inmates in postconviction proceedings. See Blodgett, supra note 123, at 58;
see also ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at 3-5.
192. See supra note 191; Mello, supra note 58, at 554-63; ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at
29-37.
California Lawyer identified the parallel between the decrease of available and skilled ap-
pellate lawyers and the increase of prisoners on death row needing representation in state
postconvictions. Kroll, supra note 191, at 26.
193. Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 168, at 336-37.
194. ABA Amicus, supra note 109, at 34.
195. Godbold, supra note 186, at 871.
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crucial function in capital litigation because the "inexorable finality [of
the death penalty] requires that no argument be left unaddressed in the
process of assuring that the death-sentenced inmate is in fact guilty and
was convicted fairly and in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards." '196
The number of death sentences reversed by the federal courts indi-
cates that state postconviction courts are overlooking the capital inmates'
claims. The inmate cannot exercise his right to postconviction relief
without the assistance of counsel. Isolated, indigent, and troubled, the
inmate must confront the complexity of the state postconviction applica-
tion procedure. As a prerequisite for federal habeas review, the state
postconviction proceeding limits the availability of federal postconviction
relief. Compounding the inmate's dilemma, trial representation is often
inadequate and volunteer counsel unavailable. The state postconviction
remedy cannot function in the reliability process without providing coun-
sel to represent the capital inmate. The eighth amendment reliability
standard mandates that the capital defendant have a right to an ap-
pointed counsel in a state postconviction proceeding. The absence of a
constitutional right to an appointed postconviction counsel risks an erro-
neous execution, thereby silencing the individual with irreparable
finality.
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196. Robbins, supra note 2, at 9.
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